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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the work of the AI4People-Automotive Committee established to advise 
more concretely on specific ethical issues that arise from autonomous vehicles (AVs). Practical 
recommendations for the automotive sector are provided across the topic areas: human agency and 
oversight, technical robustness and safety, privacy and data governance, transparency, diversity, 
non-discrimination and fairness, societal and environmental wellbeing, as well as accountability. By 
doing so, this paper distinguishes between policy recommendations that aim to assist policymakers in 
setting acceptable standards and industry recommendations that formulate guidelines for companies 
across their value chain. In the future, the automotive sector may rely on these recommendations to 
determine relevant next steps and to ensure that AVs comply with ethical principles.
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AIM ANd SCoPE oF THIS PAPER
In the past decade, many policy documents have discussed ethical issues and potential future directions 
related to new emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or autonomous systems. 
This paper presents the work of the AI4People-Automotive Committee1 established to advise more 
concretely on specific ethical issues that arise from autonomous vehicles (AVs). The committee 
consisted of industry experts and researchers from the fields of ethics, law, philosophy, engineering, 
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technology and policy. The aim of this paper is to provide the automotive sector, including both 
companies and public entities such as regulators, with concrete and practical guidelines to comply with 
ethical principles within the AI systems of AVs. Therefore, this paper could serve as a checklist for 
policymakers and companies as well as a basis for developing a certification of ethics, an ‘ecosystem 
of trust’ (European Commission, 2020b) and ultimately a ‘Good AI Society’ (Floridi et al., 2018) in 
the automotive sector. These guidelines are intended to provide a clearer vision and moral compass 
on how to proceed and what to consider when developing AVs, rather than additional barriers to 
innovation. The automotive sector is defined here in the broadest terms possible to encompass a wide 
range of companies involved in the development of vehicles, including private cars, trucks, busses 
and shuttles. Sea, air and military-type applications have been excluded due to their functional and 
ethical specificity. This paper will focus on the ethics of the AI-based tools that are used in automotive 
technology, rather than on the ethics of vehicles in general.
This paper distinguishes between high-level guidelines for policymakers (‘policy recommendations’) 
and concrete actionable recommendations for companies (‘industry recommendations’). However, 
the line between the two cannot always be drawn clearly which also highlights the importance of 
co-regulation (i.e. the interaction of legal regulation and self-regulation by companies) (Pagallo et 
al., 2019). The policy recommendations are designed to focus attention on pressing policy issues 
and assist in setting acceptable standards. Thus, the policy recommendations ultimately influence 
the industry recommendations. Responsible targets for the execution of the policy recommendations 
are: policymakers, legislators, ethics standards boards and commissions such as the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The industry recommendations formulate guidelines 
for companies across their entire value chain (especially during research & development, production 
& operations and service). Therefore, original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and car manufacturers 
are the primary responsible targets for those recommendations.
Before turning to the principles and guidelines, we note three key points of consensus among the 
authors: (1) a responsible balancing of risks or estimated harm should be permitted at any time for 
AVs; (2) a large-scale introduction of full-mode AVs (level 4 and higher) onto streets is unlikely in 
the short run, so we must consider a more incremental, step-by-step approach; and (3) policymakers 
face significant challenges now, and so there are significant pressures to quickly develop a clear 
regulatory framework.
THE GUIdELINES
Fundamental Rights Underlying the Guidelines
Particular fundamental rights are the basis for the proposed seven requirements that were originally 
derived by the High-level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (2019) (i.e. human agency and 
oversight; technical robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, 
non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental wellbeing; accountability) and 
recommendations in this paper. In addition to general human dignity, key fundamental rights 
(United Nations, 1948) that policymakers and companies in the automotive sector should recognize 
are: Right to self-determination and liberty which draws attention to human agency in self-driving 
cars (i.e. importance of override options) (see Guideline 1). Right to life and security which entails 
ensuring technical robustness and safety of operating self-driving vehicles; on a broader level, this 
includes securing societal and environmental wellbeing (see Guideline 2 and 6). Right to protection 
of personal data drawing attention to data ownership, data governance and privacy of personal data 
that is generated during the operation of self-driving cars (see Guideline 3). Right to equality and non-
discrimination requiring the avoidance of unfair bias in operating vehicles as well as the accessibility 
of benefits for every individual in society (see Guideline 5). Right to explanation which, in the field 
of autonomous driving, demands transparency and communication of the underlying functionality, 
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which can be achieved through accountability measures such as audits and logging mechanisms (see 
Guideline 3 and 7). Certainly, incompatibilities and trade-offs between fundamental rights can emerge; 
for example, life and security can be in tension with the right to self-determination. On the one hand, 
AVs are expected to improve traffic flow and decrease fatalities that are due to human error. On the 
other hand, automated driving systems reduce the driver’s autonomy, perhaps to the point of being a 
mere passenger. In this regard, the Ethics Commission on Automated and Connected Driving (BMVI, 
2017) formulated the following guideline: “In a free society, the way in which technology is statutorily 
fleshed out is such that a balance is struck between maximum personal freedom of choice in a general 
regime of development and the freedom of others and their safety” (Lütge, 2017, p. 550). In conflict 
situations, policymakers and legislators should decide which fundamental rights are to be prioritized.
Policy Recommendations
• Relevant fundamental rights to be considered in the field of autonomous driving are: human 
dignity, right to self-determination and liberty, right to life and security, right to protection of 
personal data, right to equality and non-discrimination as well as the right to explanation.
• It must be realized that there will be no technologies or policies that maximize all fundamental 
rights for everybody simultaneously. There will always be trade-offs. Therefore, policymakers and 
legislators should decide which fundamental rights are to be prioritized in particular situations.
• In doing so, policymakers and legislators should cooperate with multiple stakeholders to obtain 
necessary information for executing an evaluation and subsequent agreement on compromises 
and prioritization.
Human Agency and oversight – Including Monitoring, Training, 
Human-Machine Interfaces and External Control of Vehicle data
A few guidelines have already been developed that highlight the importance of maintaining personal 
autonomy in AVs, including possible requirements for a ‘stop’ or ‘override’ button (European 
Commission, 2020b; Lütge, 2017). At the same time, autonomy requires informed and deliberate 
control, and so overrides (and other measures) should not necessarily be universal. In particular, 
admissibility of human override should be conditional on two aspects:
1.  The level of automation of the AV2:
a.  For levels up to and including 3, there should be an override function that can be executed 
at any time;
b.  For level 4, there should be an override function that can be executed only when not impacting 
or undermining the safety mechanisms of the AV (e.g., one helpful factor to satisfy this 
requirement might be to implement overrides with a time lag). The rationale for this is that, 
if individuals were allowed to intervene immediately at any point, the inherent logic and 
longer-term plan completion of the technically functional AV is disrupted which may lead 
to increased risks for all parties involved;
c.  For level 5, it is not necessary to include an override function, as it would take away many 
of the original advantages such as inclusive accessibility (e.g., by excluding elderly, disabled 
individuals, youth or individuals who do not hold a driving license), safety (e.g., humans 
taking control may be out of practice), trust (e.g., giving drivers the impression that the 
system could fail), and comfort (e.g., limiting opportunities for new and more comfortable 
mobility options and designs)3;
2.  The state and behavior of the driver:
a.  When the driver’s abilities are impaired (e.g., due to alcohol consumption), the availability 
of an override function should be limited and preceded by a request for confirmation.
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Nevertheless, recent examples of AVs involved in crashes draw attention to the failing assumption 
of responsibility by individuals. The underlying problems relate to overconfidence in, or overreliance 
on, the AI system as companies do not adequately warn drivers and/or drivers violate the guidelines 
provided by the companies.
Therefore, companies must clearly distinguish and make apparent whether a driverless system 
is being used or whether a driver remains accountable for driving (Lütge, 2017). In order to realize 
effective human agency and clarity over personal responsibility, our approach concerning AVs is 
threefold:
1.  Companies should put in place technical safeguards to help drivers remain fully aware and 
ready to take over the driving when the AV expects them to. AVs should monitor drivers and 
help drivers remain awake and attentive. For example, current driving monitoring systems using 
camera-based facial recognition technology determine the driver’s level of vigilance and trigger 
alerts to the driver when signs of distraction are detected (Research & Markets, 2019). Other 
monitoring systems are related to the amount of torque in the steering wheel. For example, Tesla 
(2020) locks the activation of the autopilot mode if the driver seems inattentive (e.g., insufficient 
torque is applied or warnings are repeatedly ignored). The upcoming regulation on automated 
lane keeping systems will obligate car manufacturers to introduce driver availability recognition 
systems and clarify the criteria that assess whether a driver is deemed to be unavailable (e.g., 
eye closure) (UNECE, 2020b). UNECE also considers that “[a]utomated/autonomous vehicles 
should include driver engagement monitoring in cases where drivers could be involved (e.g., 
take-over requests) “ (UNECE, 2019, p. 3). It is important that handovers be aligned with the 
level of automation: As the level of automation increases, drivers engage more in other activities 
such as watching a video, which decreases human capability to take over control (Merat et al., 
2014). Thus, handovers should conform to human capabilities by, for example, obviating “the 
need for an abrupt handover of control to the driver (emergency)” (Lütge, 2017, p. 556). There 
is currently no agreement on what constitutes a comfortable transition time, and so we do not 
propose a universal prescription on this point. In the meantime, companies should provide 
documentation that justifies their particular handover window. A possible starting point for 
determining a reasonable transition time might be that AVs, as they drive, could learn about the 
capabilities of drivers from aggregated traffic data and adjust the vehicle’s parameters accordingly 
(respecting a safe minimum time response). 
2.  Companies should train drivers on the capabilities and limitations of AVs (European Commission, 
2020b), so that individuals can make informed decisions and do not over rely on the vehicle’s 
capabilities (see also UNECE, 2019). This training should be tailored to different demographic 
groups, given recent studies that show demographic differences in interactions with AVs (Manser 
et al., 2019). Training programs should cover topics such as the “[system’s] functional intent, 
operational parameters, system capabilities and limitations, engagement/disengagement methods, 
HMI, emergency fallback scenarios, operational design domain parameters (i.e., limitations), 
and mechanisms that could alter [the system’s] behavior while in service” (NHTSA, 2017, p. 
15). Drivers should also be trained on the purpose of using an AVs, the degree of automation, 
and conditions for potential system failures (Manser et al., 2019).
3.  The importance of human autonomy applies not only to drivers but also to humans outside the 
vehicle such as pedestrians. Therefore, companies should ensure that these latter individuals can 
also exercise their autonomy. For example, AVs should have mechanisms to show pedestrians 
that they have been recognized and reveal the AV’s motion intentions, perhaps with LED strips 
to convey perception information (e.g., displaying cool colors for far away obstacles and warm 
colors for near obstacles in the environment) (Florentine et al., 2016). These external human-
machine interfaces facilitate human agency for pedestrians, as they enable them to feel less 
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anxious about the technology and have more information to move freely and safely. However, 
further research is required to determine the most useful interfaces (Rouchitsas & Alm, 2019).
Additionally, external oversight mechanisms need to be put in place to control for adequate 
human agency. Therefore, although internal overriding functions may not always or immediately 
be available for (drivers in) AVs, general oversight should be possible at all times. Live and total 
oversight is both impracticable and unwarranted (Lütge, 2017). However, under certain circumstances, 
such as following a fatal accident, and depending on the legal and regulatory framework in place in 
the country where the accident occurred, it may be appropriate to designate an organization in each 
jurisdiction that is permitted to retrospectively look at the code and data within the AV to determine 
the cause of the accident (for more information see Guideline 7).
Industry Recommendations
• There should be a conditional override option allowing the control to be handed back to the 
driver. The admissibility of an override function depends on the level of automation of the AV 
(up to level 3: at any time; level 4: corresponding to safety mechanisms of an AV; level 5: not 
required) as well as on the state and behavior of the driver (e.g., impaired ability).
• AVs should continuously assess and monitor the driver’s attentiveness and ability to intervene. 
Before operation, the AV could pose control questions to the driver (e.g., did you ingest any 
drugs or alcohol?); during operation, the AV could use sensors and biometric technology to do 
so. The upcoming UN Regulation on Automated Lane Keeping Systems can serve as a baseline 
for car manufacturers to develop appropriate driver attentiveness recognition systems.
• Handover should correspond to the driver’s capabilities. Therefore, AVs could learn about drivers’ 
capabilities and response times during operation from aggregated data and adjust the vehicle’s 
parameters accordingly (respecting a safe minimum time response).
• Companies should provide documentation that justifies their particular handover window.
• Training programs should be tailored to different demographic groups and exhibit minimum 
elements that should be regarded in a training curriculum (e.g., limitations and capabilities of 
AVs) based on findings of recent studies.
• AVs should offer a ‘training mode’, for the first kilometers to train drivers on the AV’s functioning.
• External human-machine interfaces should clearly communicate about the vehicle’s motion 
intention and awareness of other traffic participants to humans outside the vehicle.
Policy Recommendations
• Policymakers should finalize what constitutes acceptable and legitimate override functions and 
define applicable situations for activation.
• Policymakers should determine standards for drivers’ monitoring, training requirements, handover 
routines and external human-machine interfaces. These standards should be as global as possible.
• Policymakers in each jurisdiction should consider designating an organization in each jurisdiction 
that is allowed to look at the code and data within the AV in the event of a fatal accident involving 
an AV or a corresponding legal proceeding.
Technical Robustness and Safety – Including Resilience to Attack and 
Security, Fallback Plan and General Safety, Accuracy and Reliability
A prime requirement of AVs should be safety, both in ordinary operations and if subject to adversarial 
attack (Lütge, 2017).
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There are many differing forms of potential threats to AVs, and so governmental entities such 
as the ENISA (2019) or UNECE (2020a) have created holistic summaries and categorizations of 
relevant dangers and vulnerabilities. Firstly, there are threats that do not solely apply to AVs but 
also to conventional vehicles such as technical malfunctions and outages including sensor and other 
failures (ENISA, 2019). Secondly, there are threats that are particularly important for AVs and can 
be subsumed under the term ‘cybersecurity’. Potential cybersecurity threats include the following:
• Hijacking such as unauthorized information disclosure or extraction of copyrighted or proprietary 
software from vehicle systems (product piracy) (UNECE, 2020a);
• Abuse such as attacks on back-end servers that stops the vehicle’s functioning (e.g., disruptions 
of communication and external connectivity) or threats regarding the vehicle’s update procedures 
(e.g., preventing the rollout of critical software updates) (UNECE, 2020a);
• Passive behavioral attacks such as individuals intentionally interfering with AVs. For example, 
human drivers might tend to drive more aggressively around AVs or jaywalking may increase 
because it is known that AVs respect the safety distance.
There are several categorizations of threats that relate to the data stored in vehicles on an 
associated server and to the information exchanged during communication between the vehicle and 
the server. These threats can impact the safe operation of the vehicle, alter the software operation, 
and generate data breaches, though many of these threats are not specific to AVs but also can be 
found in current vehicles.
It is essential to develop mechanisms to test an AV’s cybersecurity management system before 
operation. The EU Cybersecurity Act aims to establish a general certification framework for ICT digital 
products, services, and processes that allows the “creation of tailored and risk-based EU certification 
schemes” (ECCG, 2020). Similarly, the UN is preparing a regulation on uniform provisions concerning 
the approval of vehicles with regard to cybersecurity and of their cybersecurity management systems. 
For example, the draft regulation (as of March 2020) proposes an international approval mark or 
the verification of a manufacturer’s compliance by an approval authority (UNECE, 2020a). In the 
future, such clear regulations and standardized tests will be necessary so that all companies are 
informed about, and comply with, the universal requirements for cybersecurity management systems. 
Governments should “promote mutual recognition systems and certification schemes that are built 
upon international standards [...] to facilitate international harmonization on privacy and security” 
(Joaquin Acosta, 2019, p. 215). SAE J3061, a comprehensive cybersecurity implementation guideline 
for the automotive industry, can serve as a starting point (SAE International, 2016).
Additional to threats, measures need to be developed that assess the general functionality of an 
AV. The Ethics Commission on Automated and Connected Driving suggests that “[t]he public sector 
is responsible for guaranteeing the safety of the automated and connected systems introduced and 
licensed in the public street environment. Driving systems thus need official licensing and monitoring” 
(Lütge, 2017, p. 550). For example, a kind of TÜV, i.e. a technical inspection agency, for AVs could 
be developed. Relevant factors to be assessed here are accuracy, reliability and fallback options of 
AVs. In terms of accuracy and reliability, it could be tested to what extent the AV’s underlying “AI 
meets, or exceeds, the performance of a competent & careful human driver”, refrains from engaging in 
“careless, dangerous or reckless driving behavior” as well as to what extent it “remains aware, willing 
and able to avoid collisions at all times” (ADA, 2020). SAE International published a more detailed 
and elaborate list of driving safety performance assessment metrics such as minimum safe distance 
factors or proper responses (Wishart et al., 2020). Furthermore, safeguards against technical failures 
and outages need to be established. The IEEE P7009 standard for fail-safe design of autonomous 
and semi-autonomous systems could serve as a baseline for developers. The standard provides clear 
procedures for measuring, testing, and certifying a system’s ability to fail safely as well as instructions 
for improvement in the case of unsatisfactory performance (IEEE, 2019).
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In terms of general safety and fallback plans, “[i]n emergency situations, the vehicle must 
autonomously, i.e., without human assistance, enter into a ‘safe condition’” (Lütge, 2017, p. 556). 
This condition has been specified by proposing the terms ‘minimal risk condition’ and ‘minimum 
risk maneuver’. The Minimal risk condition is “[a] condition to which a user or an ADS may bring 
a vehicle after performing the DDT [dynamic driving task] fallback in order to reduce the risk of 
a crash when a given trip cannot or should not be completed” (SAE International, 2018, p. 11). 
The “Minimum risk maneuver means a procedure aimed at minimizing risks in traffic, which is 
automatically performed by the system” (Leonhardt, 2018, p. 12). Causes for the execution of such 
a maneuver could be detection that the driver is inactive and not reacting to transition demands, or 
reaching system failure / boundaries when the driver is not responding to transition demands. In such 
situations, potential maneuvers could entail “further lane keeping for a certain time, enlarging gap to 
other road users, […] slowing down to standstill” (BMVI, 2015, p. 4). What constitutes an appropriate 
maneuver depends on (1) the operation condition of the vehicle (e.g., technical failures that hinder 
the AV to perform a fallback), (2) the prevailing environmental conditions (e.g., density of traffic) 
and (3) regulatory boundary conditions (Leonhardt, 2018). Although SAE J3016 (Leonhardt, 2018) 
makes significant progress regarding the nature of a safe or minimal risk condition, the definition of 
such conditions as well as the particular circumstances in which such conditions should be activated 
(e.g., incidents that leave the driver incapacitated such as a stroke) need to be further determined 
and harmonized.
Overall, experimenting with new AVs and testing their technical robustness and safety should 
follow a stepwise approach: For example, “the levels of testing that should be conducted before testing 
on open roads, including, for example, the use of simulation, hardware-in-the-loop testing” should 
be identified and standardized (European Commission, 2020a, p. 29). Recognizing the challenges of 
physical test strategies for AVs (length of time they take to complete, high number of hours of drive 
time required), ESTECO has developed a white-box / scenario-based verification system to investigate 
the performance of ADAS/AD functions across different sensors, algorithms, actuation and scenarios 
(ESTECO, 2020). Systems like these can act as helpful antecedents to actual testing on open roads.
Industry Recommendations
• The prime requirement of AVs should be safety.
• In addition to threats that relate to conventional vehicles, manufacturers of AVs should particularly 
focus on cybersecurity threats. In doing so, companies need to comply with regulations for 
cybersecurity management systems. SAE J3061 could serve as a guideline to design cybersecurity 
into AVs throughout the entire development life cycle process.
• In terms of general functionality and safety, vehicles need to pass an official test that assures 
the system’s accuracy, reliability and adequacy of its fallback options. The SAE Driving Safety 
Performance Assessment Metrics and the IEEE P7009 standard could serve as a baseline to 
design fail-safe mechanisms of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems.
Policy Recommendations
• Regulations need to be developed that reflect consensus on the method by which to grant approval 
to a vehicle’s cybersecurity management system.
• Policymakers need to work with industry experts to develop a standardized test for the general 
functionality and safety of AVs to assure the system’s accuracy, reliability and adequacy of its 
fallback options. This test could serve as a basis for the approval of AVs for sale to consumers.
• Policymakers need to collaborate with industry experts to determine and harmonize the definition 
of a ‘safe condition’ / ‘minimal risk condition’, the corresponding ‘minimum risk maneuvers’, 
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and the circumstances in which such maneuvers should be executed. In doing so, SAE J3016 
could serve as a baseline.
Privacy and data Governance – Including Respect for Privacy, 
Transparency and Communication, and Access to data
Conventional vehicles collect data through event data recorders (that record technical information about 
a vehicle’s operation involved in crashes) and on-board diagnostic information (to access information 
about driver behavior, emission measures or diagnose performance issues). With new technological 
options, connected vehicles and AVs will make transportation safer and more convenient. However, 
many features depend on the collection and processing of ever more data in order to function effectively 
(Future of Privacy Forum, 2017).
Therefore, it is essential to specify the type and scope of data that AVs are permitted to collect. 
Three types of data can be distinguished that warrant special attention:
• Geolocation data (e.g., for activating route navigation), which could reveal the passenger’s 
location and life habits of individuals (EDPB, 2020).
• Biometric data (e.g., for user recognition or tracking of driver’s attention), which could be used 
to enable unauthorized access to a vehicle and enable access to a driver’s profile settings and 
preferences (EDPB, 2020). The collection of this type of data applies not only to drivers but also 
to individuals outside the vehicle such as pedestrians.
• Driver behavior data, which could reveal unlawful behavior, including traffic violations such 
as speeding (EDPB, 2020).
Some of this data will be collected automatically, and some will require consent from the vehicle 
owner or driver in order to activate and use certain functions. Careful consideration needs to be given 
to the collection of data from inside the vehicle that relates to things other than the operation of the 
vehicle. Additionally, individual’s rights should be considered at group level (e.g., drivers versus 
pedestrians) (European Commission, 2020a). For example, data (especially, biometric data) of 
external parties such as individuals walking on the street should warrant special protection. Although 
the European Commission (2020a) has additionally problematized data collection when AVs pass 
through particular locations such as private and non-public settings, we suggest that collecting data 
in private spaces should not in general be restricted in order to guarantee an AV’s functionality. The 
focus should instead be on the mode of data collection and sharing.
Overall, services that collect and share data should comply with all applicable laws, and be 
accompanied by a strict privacy and data governance policy that includes, but is not limited to, the 
following (Future of Privacy Forum, 2017):
1.  Transparency and Communication: Manufacturers need to provide clear and concise privacy 
policies to the vehicle owners that describe data collection and use. These policies must be readily 
understood by vehicle owners. These policies could, for example, be displayed in the purchase 
agreement, user manual or in the interface of an app. This is also in line with the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) stating that controllers must, before personal data is obtained, 
provide the data subjects with information necessary to ensure transparent processing about the 
existence of automated decision-making.
2.  Affirmative and Explicit Consent: The driver’s educated and affirmative consent is required 
before certain sensitive data is collected or used. This requirement is particularly critical for 
marketing uses, or if the data will be shared with unaffiliated third parties. This is in line with the 
guideline of the Ethics Commission on Automated and Connected Driving about the permissibility 
to use data that is generated by AVs for other business models, which states that lastly “[i]t is 
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the vehicle keepers and vehicle users who decide whether their vehicle data that are generated 
are to be forwarded and used” (Lütge, 2017, p. 555). Additionally, even in the absence of laws 
requiring it, users should always have the right to opt-out or request that particular data not be 
collected, unless those data are critical for the AV safe system’s operation.
3.  Limited and Useful Sharing With Third Parties: There should only be limited circumstances 
where manufacturers are allowed to share a vehicle’s data with external parties. Under appropriate 
conditions and with the appropriate safeguards, data that guarantees safe operation of the vehicle 
and other traffic participants as well as data that provides benefits to overall society and is 
of public interest should be shared. For example, AVs could provide information to the local 
department of transportation about a pothole on the road, so that infrastructure inspections and 
maintenance resources can be better allocated (in consideration of a fair and unbiased distribution 
of resources) and traffic information can be shared to improve traffic flow and promote safety. 
Accordingly, the European Commission has issued a regulation requiring public or private road 
operators and service providers to share and exchange relevant road safety-related traffic data 
such as the observation of a temporary slippery road or exceptional weather conditions (European 
Commission, 2013). Personally identifiable information must always be given the highest levels 
of protection. If data must be shared with third parties due to the above mentioned reasons, they 
should be anonymized and deidentified before being transmitted (EDPB, 2020). For example, 
the EU Data Task Force partnered with TomTom to improve road safety by sharing anonymized 
vehicle and infrastructure data between countries and manufacturers. For example, this will allow 
the detection of dangerous road conditions such as slippery roads and issue warnings to other 
traffic participants. “The EU Data Task Force (DTF) will use a decentralised data collaboration 
architecture to share vehicle-generated data […]. The datasets will then be taken by TomTom, 
processed further, and delivered back to other vehicles and road authorities via its live Traffic 
services” (Europawire, 2019). In line with Article 3(c) of Directive 2010/40/EU, data and 
procedures for the provision of road safety-related traffic information should be free of charge to 
users (European Commission, 2013). However, past studies showed individuals can sometimes 
be identified using anonymized data (Archie et al., 2018; Techcrunch, 2006), and so companies 
must ensure that the shared data does not permit re-identification (e.g., by minimizing collected 
data or using differential privacy techniques).
4.  Compliance With Pertinent Data Protection Standards and Regulations: All data collection 
and processing obviously must respect relevant regulations (EDPB, 2020), such as the GDPR 
that applies to the processing of personal individual data, as well as the ePrivacy directive for 
information access on the terminal equipment of a user (EDPB, 2020; European Commission, 
2020b). The IEEE P7002 standard specifies how to manage privacy issues for systems that collect 
personal data, e.g., by providing a guideline for a privacy impact assessment (IEEE, 2019).
Industry Recommendations
• Manufacturers should follow a strict privacy and data governance policy that includes transparency 
and communication to users, requesting affirmative consent and allowing limited sharing of data 
with third parties (including governments). In doing so, companies should comply with applicable 
standards and regulations such as the GDPR, the ePrivacy directive or the IEEE P7002.
• Before transmitting personal information from an AV to third parties, steps must be taken to 
ensure that it cannot be traced back to an individual.
• Manufacturers should implement data protocols defining who can have access to data under 
which conditions.
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Policy Recommendations
• Before receiving AV data, policymakers need to make clear what types of AV data they are 
seeking and how that data will enable them to improve public safety or some other legitimate 
public purpose (e.g., improve infrastructure, traffic flow and law compliance).
• At the EU level, building on Article 3(c) of Directive 2010/40/EU, consideration should be given 
to expanding the list of events and relevant traffic information that should be communicated 
free of charge.
Transparency – As A Key Mechanism to Realize all other Requirements
In the automotive sector, we contend that transparency is not a freestanding desideratum, but rather 
a key mechanism to realize the other principles or requirements. Transparency plays a major role for 
achieving the principle of privacy and data governance, requiring that manufacturers provide vehicle 
owners with information regarding data collection practices and intended uses (for more information 
see Guideline 3). Similarly, to satisfy the principle of accountability, the implementation of explicit 
transparency measures such as logging mechanisms or black boxes are essential (for more information 
see Guideline 7). The IEEE P7001 (“Transparency of Autonomous Systems”) standard can serve as 
a baseline to address these issues.
diversity, Non-discrimination and Fairness – Including the Avoidance 
of Unfair Bias, Responsible Balancing of Risks and Accessibility
Generally and regarding the operations of AVs, no distinction between individuals should be 
allowed and fair treatment of all humans should be enacted. This is clearly stated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights […] without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status” (United Nations, 1948, p. 2; Kriebitz & Lütge, 2020). In the field of 
AI (e.g., AVs), this obligation becomes ever more important as implicit biases and discrimination 
may unintentionally, and without transparency, be incorporated into algorithms. Studies show that 
systems can have differential performance for people of different ethnic groups, which consequently 
can result in them being harmed. For example, a study from the Georgia Institute of Technology 
illustrates how state-of-the-art AI object detection systems are less likely to detect pedestrians with 
darker skin color than those with lighter skin (Wilson, Hoffman & Morgenstern, 2019). Another 
study from the US National Institute for Transportation and Communities investigated the driving 
behavior through crosswalks that “revealed that Black pedestrians were passed by twice as many 
cars and experienced wait times that were 32% longer than White pedestrians” (Goddard, Kahn, & 
Adkins, 2015, p. 2). If such driving data is fed into a machine-learning algorithm, the system may 
discover this discriminatory pattern and adapt it into its functioning (Forbes, 2020).
In order to ensure non-discriminatory programming and functioning, the systems need to be 
trained and tested for unfair bias. Companies should test their algorithms for bias and discrimination 
and demonstrate that certain fairness standards are met (Vox, 2019). Laws could be enacted, for 
example, that mandate that facial recognition software used by public entities and companies must 
be independently tested for bias (Secretary of State Washington, 2020). The IEEE P7003 standard for 
algorithmic bias considerations sets out instructions for eliminating bias when developing algorithms: 
it provides developers of algorithms for autonomous systems with protocols and includes criteria for 
selecting validation data sets (IEEE, 2019). The training should be different depending on the location 
where the system operates: when a technology is launched into the market, companies could localize 
it using location specific data. Companies could ensure that their development teams are sufficiently 
diverse to guard against intentional and implicit bias being incorporated into their algorithms and 
technologies (Vox, 2019).
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Past literature has extensively debated dilemma situations (e.g., unforeseen and unavoidable 
accidents) with reference to the famous trolley cases. The ideal is to avoid such situations in which 
accidents are unavoidable in the first place; for example, the lateral position of AVs on a lane can 
be adjusted to tune the risk posed to all other traffic participants (e.g., how much room should be 
given to a bicyclist?). Therefore, we argue to move away from the debate around dilemma situations. 
Instead, a responsible balancing of risk or estimated harm should be permitted for AVs at all times. 
This balancing decision should not be based on personal features of individuals such as age or gender 
(Lin, 2016; Lütge, 2017). Instead, as the severity of injury increases in proportion to the kinetic 
energy, estimated harm could be quantified and balanced by more objective factors such as the type 
or speed of particular traffic participants and the impact angle under which a collision would occur 
(Geißlinger et al., 2020). Taking into account the type of road users would grant vulnerable traffic 
participants (e.g., pedestrians or cyclists) the same level of protection as other road users (European 
Commission, 2020a). Overall, the consideration of these factors could help achieve a “[g]eneral 
programming to reduce the number of personal injuries” (Lütge, 2017, p. 552).
Besides the unbiased vehicle’s internal functioning, AVs should be human-centric (European 
Commission, 2020a). In particular, AVs should be equally usable for and accessible to all individuals, 
which requires a non-discriminatory design. For example, age or the presence of a disability is not 
always considered by automotive companies, leading to potential issues of discrimination. Therefore, 
levels of differing abilities need to be acknowledged (e.g., a young individual may have quicker 
reflexes for executing requests than elderly people) and the systems need to be adapted accordingly 
for different users, so that everyone can benefit from this new technology (for more information see 
also Guideline 1).
Industry Recommendations
• Companies should test their vehicle’s AI systems for unfair performance differences across skin 
tone, gender, age and other characteristics. The IEEE P7003 standard can serve as a baseline to 
address and eliminate issues of bias in the creation of algorithms.
• When a technology is launched into the market, companies should localize it using data and train 
the model using multiple diverse data sets that are location specific.
• The AI developing team should be as inclusive as possible to include the broadest group possible 
in terms of demographics such as ethnicity.
• A responsible balancing of risks and estimated harm to reduce the number of personal injuries 
should be permitted for AVs without discriminating against personal characteristics. Instead, 
factors underlying the balancing could include the type or speed of particular traffic participants 
and the impact angle under which a collision would occur.
• The personalization of AVs should be accessible by design and as inclusive as possible (e.g., 
disabilities included). Before an AV is released onto the streets, companies should demonstrate 
their plans and actions that ensure customizing-options to their vehicles (e.g., possibility to take 
away seats or include a ramp for entering the vehicle with a wheelchair).
Policy Recommendations
• Consideration should be given to having ethics standards boards test and assess that the systems 
for AVs are working properly, fairly and in an unbiased manner.
• Consideration should be given to requiring carmakers to explain the procedures they have put 
in place to make their designs accessible and avoid biases before granting them authorization to 
sell their vehicles to the public.
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Societal and Environmental wellbeing – Including Sustainability 
and Environmental Friendliness and Social Impact
In terms of societal and environmental wellbeing, the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by all 
United Nations Member States can serve as a reference point. Goal 3 (to “[e]nsure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all at all ages”) and goal 11 (aiming to “[m]ake cities and human settlements 
inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable“) are particularly relevant to this topic (United Nations, 
2015, p. 14). Companies and policymakers in the automotive sector should focus on meeting the 
following objectives:
1.  Increased Public Health and Mobility: AVs can improve society’s health by avoiding fatalities 
that are due to human error (Bartneck et al., 2019). This is in line with Vision Zero, which states 
that eventually no one will and shall be killed or seriously injured within the road transport system 
(Ministry of Transport and Communications, 1997). The introduction of AVs could offer greater 
mobility solutions for a major part of society that is mobility-impaired, whether the elderly, 
young (without a driving license) or those who were otherwise unable to drive (BCG, 2017; 
WEF, 2018). This could positively affect mental health (e.g., due to feeling less dependent on 
others) and create a more inclusive society (Lim & Taeihagh, 2018). These benefits, however, 
can only be realized if safety and diversity standards are adhered to (for more information see 
Guideline 2 and 5);
2.  Better Traffic Flow: AVs could reduce congestion and delays (e.g., during peak hours) and 
improve traffic flows and efficiency, especially when combined with shared mobility options. 
For example, using a traffic simulation model for Boston, it was found that the simulations that 
had included AV technology yielded less congestion, shorter travel times and more street space 
and (BCG, 2017; WEF, 2018). These benefits stem mostly from AVs’ connectivity to external 
communication networks so that data can be managed and distributed in real time enabling 
methods such as platooning (Lim & Taeihagh, 2018). However, if not managed properly, it could 
also increase traffic flow and generate inefficiencies of uncoordinated traffic (Joaquin Acosta, 
2018a). Proactive measures such as adopting a fitting physical and digital infrastructure, could 
improve the existing traffic situation by at least 15-20% (Inframix, 2020);
3.  Decreased Carbon Emissions: Widespread adoption of AVs could reduce environmental 
degradation through reduced emissions and energy consumption (BCG, 2017). This is especially 
true if unnecessary acceleration and braking is reduced (Lim & Taeihagh, 2018). A concrete 
action point for companies would be to design AI systems that reduce vehicles’ CO2 emissions. 
For example, companies could offer by default an eco-driving mode with a speed average that 
minimizes emissions and avoids unnecessary acceleration or braking. Many of the benefits relating 
to the reduction of carbon emission can be achieved by combining AVs with other disruptive 
technologies such as the electrification of vehicles (BCG, 2020). In addition, promoting AV 
shared mobility could “lessen the environmental impact of passenger vehicles by decreasing 
the number of vehicles on the road” (Joaquin Acosta, 2018a, p. 3). A concrete action point for 
policymakers would be to facilitate research and development for solutions to combine AVs with 
other disruptive technologies (e.g., electrification, shared mobility).
While these potential benefits are substantial, there is also significant uncertainty about the net 
impact of introducing AVs. Many measures of benefits focus on improvements per vehicle-mile 
traveled (VMT). However, the increased mobility and convenience benefits will potentially lead to 
significant increases in VMTs, potentially leading to increased total pollution, congestion, and so 
forth, despite the per-VMT gains (Geary & Danks, 2019). Thus, as technology continually develops, 
companies and policymakers in the automotive sector should follow a stepwise implementation process 
to ensure that introduction of AVs provides net benefits. Moreover, this implementation process must 
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be combined with a simultaneous adaption of infrastructure (physical and digital). “Needed structural 
improvements include dedicated lanes to separate AVs from other traffic, and sensors to enable self-
driving cars to communicate with their environment” (BCG, 2020). Otherwise, if AVs enter traffic 
in an uncoordinated way and without a fitting infrastructure, traffic flow and other benefits may be 
degraded. Several projects of the EU Horizon 2020 program have been focusing on this challenge 
(e.g., CoEXist or Inframix) (European Commission, 2019).
City planners, road operators and local authorities should use the findings of such projects to 
make informed decisions on where to roll out new mobility models and how to update their road 
network accordingly. Collaboration with multiple private-sector leaders and national agencies is key 
to fostering innovation and progress: “the success of AMoD [autonomous mobility on demand] will 
depend to a large extent on establishing close partnerships among mobility providers, infrastructure 
companies, and city authorities” (BCG, 2020).
Industry Recommendations
• When developing their products, automotive companies should consider integrating and providing 
benefits of increased public health and mobility, better traffic flow and decreased carbon emission.
• Manufacturers should offer by default an eco-driving mode with a speed average that avoids 
unnecessary acceleration or braking and thus reduces carbon emissions.
• When developing AVs, car manufacturers should try to integrate other disruptive technologies 
such as electrification and shared mobility.
Policy Recommendations
• Policymakers should follow a stepwise implementation process and concentrate on mixed traffic 
scenarios. Policymakers should promote the integration of AVs in existing transport systems 
instead of competition between them, for example, by prioritizing research and development of 
AV solutions for public and shared mobility.
• A simultaneous adaption of physical and digital infrastructure is essential (e.g., lanes that separate 
AVs from other traffic).
• In doing so, collaboration with multiple actors such as private-sector leaders and national agencies 
is key to fostering innovation and progress (e.g., make use of projects investigating differing 
mobility models).
Accountability – Including Auditability, Measures of Transparency, 
Reporting of Negative Impact, and Redress
The attribution of liability and responsibilities for AVs is a challenging issue. “The first step towards 
the creation of a culture of responsibility is the study, deliberation and agreement on the different 
responsibilities of different stakeholders” (European Commission, 2020a, p. 56). In case of accidents, 
the AV itself cannot be held morally accountable since it is not considered a moral agent (Gogoll & 
Müller, 2017). Responsible parties will instead be manufacturers, component suppliers, technology 
companies, infrastructure providers or car holders / drivers. Therefore, policymakers should clarify the 
concept of a producer as well as review regulations on product liability (e.g., European Commission, 
2018). This will, of course, vary depending on the motor vehicle laws in place in different countries. 
When adapting existing regulations to AVs, regulators may have to choose between different liability 
regimes for different situations and levels of automation. For example, strict liability concepts may 
mean that for AVs, the manufacturer can be held liable if the automated mode is switched on, whereas, 
if not, the driver is considered liable. On the other hand, one could argue that liability should move 
gradually from one actor to the next (e.g., from the car manufacturer to the driver) depending on the 
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driver’s level of autonomy and solo action. For guidance, regulators could look to Law Labs (Joaquin 
Acosta, 2018b). Law Labs are a proposed concept to experiment with different regulatory approaches 
for a given innovation (e.g., AVs), similar to how regulatory sandboxes experiment with innovations 
in controlled environments (operating under temporary regulatory exemptions). For example, traffic 
rules could be revised and it could be investigated under which circumstances AVs are allowed to 
not to comply with a traffic rule (European Commission, 2020a).
In order to provide clarity about the causes of accidents, companies in the automotive sector may 
want to consider the following issues.
Regularly Conduct Internal and External Audits
In terms of internal audits, manufacturers should execute continuous optimization and tests. This is in 
line with the guidelines of the Ethics Commission on Automated and Connected Driving, which state 
that “[l]iability for damage caused by activated automated driving systems is governed by the same 
principles as in other product liability […:] manufacturers or operators are obliged to continuously 
optimize their systems and also to observe systems they have already delivered” (Lütge, 2017, p. 
553). In doing so, companies should conduct a risk assessment by listing factors that may increase 
risk and uncertainty regarding a vehicle’s operation and by proactively implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. Risks may stem from the vehicle’s technology (e.g., technical failure to transmit 
sensor data), the actions of other traffic participants (e.g., disobeying traffic law such as jaywalking), 
external circumstances (e.g., the state of the road, weather conditions) or the vehicle’s driving behavior 
(e.g., speed).
In addition to adhering to internal standards and audit requirements, external test centers could 
perform conformity assessments and grant certifications since “independent assessment will increase 
trust and ensure objectivity” (European Commission, 2020b, p. 25). Common audit areas for a 
certification system are – similar to the AI4People requirements – autonomy and control, fairness, 
transparency, reliability, security and data protection. Expected benefits of an AI certification would 
be trust in the application, orientation for customers and developers, fulfillment of norms such as 
cybersecurity and data security and comparable market equality (IAIS, 2019).
Implement Explicit Measures of Transparency
These transparency measures should pertain to the development as well as the operation of AVs. 
Before operation, during the development phase, companies should retain records and data including 
data sets used for training (e.g., selection process) and document the programming and training 
methodologies. This is particularly important if authorities seek to review the underlying logic of a 
system and inspect relevant documentation (European Commission, 2020b). Also, during operations, 
relevant information should be recorded through logging mechanisms and black boxes integrated 
into AVs (Lütge, 2017). Regarding the black box, companies could consider an event data recorder 
and data storage system for AVs that record data of “the system status, occurrence of malfunctions, 
degradations or failures in a way that can be used to establish the cause of any crash and to identify 
the status of the automated/autonomous driving system and the status of the driver” (UNECE, 
2019, pp. 3-4). These measures will ensure that the functioning and actions of AVs are explainable 
in retrospect. Overall, “[i]nternational standardization of the […] documentation (logging) is to be 
sought in order to ensure the compatibility of the logging or documentation obligations as automotive 
and digital technologies increasingly cross national borders” (Lütge, 2017, p. 555). For example, the 
upcoming regulation on automated lane keeping systems will determine what events are recorded by 
data storage systems for AVs (e.g., emergency maneuvers, failures) (UNECE, 2020b). IEEE P7001 
provides such a standard for the transparency and accountability of autonomous systems so that the 
reasons why a technology makes certain decisions can be determined (IEEE, 2019). Similarly, SAE 
J3197 aims to govern data element definition, to provide a minimum data element set and common 
data output formats for an automated driving system data logger (SAE International, 2020).
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Finally, external communication and reporting of performance and negative impact should be 
regularly required for companies in the automotive sector. Manufacturers and regulators should 
anticipate that individuals will want explanations when an AV’s system did not perform as expected 
and intended. This is similarly stated in the ethical guidelines for trustworthy AI: “Whenever an AI 
system has a significant impact on people’s lives, it should be possible to demand a suitable explanation 
of the AI system’s decision-making process“ (High-level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 
2019, p. 18). In California, for example, Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) such as Lyft 
have to provide the California Public Utilities Commission with reports regarding zero tolerance 
complaints, violations and collisions of their vehicles on an annual basis (California Public Utilities 
Commission, 2020). Further information to disclose may be the tradeoffs made within algorithms, 
the number of past accidents put into context (e.g., relative number of accidents during test drives 
compared to total number of test drives) as well as safety measures initiated to counteract these 
accidents. Thereby data, algorithmic and AI literacy is improved (European Commission, 2020a).
Industry Recommendations
• Manufacturers should continuously conduct internal audits (e.g., assessing potential risks to the 
safe operation of AVs) and subsequently optimize their systems.
• Manufacturers should be transparent about the scope and process of their internal audits and risk 
assessments (e.g., space of conditions that are checked for).
• The internal audits should be complemented with regular external audits by independent test 
centers.
• Manufacturers should develop specific measures of transparency. This includes storing records and 
data of the underlying system logic (e.g., used training data sets) as well as logging mechanisms 
and black boxes (e.g., an event data recorder and data storage system) that document the actions 
of / in AVs during operation. The upcoming UN Regulation on Automated Lane Keeping Systems 
can serve as a baseline for vehicle manufacturers to develop appropriate data storage systems for 
AVs. SAE J3197 and the IEEE P7001 standard can serve as a baseline to address requirements 
for transparency and accountability of autonomous systems.
• Companies should transparently communicate and report performance and negative impacts of 
AVs (e.g., number of collisions, tradeoffs within algorithms).
Policy Recommendations
• Regulators should adapt laws and regulations concerning AVs and liability as the technology 
continues to develop. Regulators should clarify where responsibility lies in certain situations 
and ensure that privacy and cybersecurity damages are taken into account.
• Policymakers should consider establishing test centers that regularly request that companies 
perform conformity assessments and provide certifications.
CoNCLUSIoN
This paper provides practical recommendations for the automotive sector to deal with ethical issues 
regarding: human agency and oversight, technical robustness and safety, privacy and data governance, 
transparency, diversity, non-discrimination and fairness, societal and environmental wellbeing as well as 
accountability. By doing so, this paper distinguishes between policy and industry recommendations in 
suggesting first steps to be taken by both policymakers and companies. The following list summarizes 
all recommendations. In the future, we encourage stakeholders in the automotive sector to rely on these 
recommendations to determine relevant actions and to ensure that AVs comply with ethical principles.
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AI4PEoPLE PRACTICAL RECoMMENdATIoNS 
FoR THE AUToMoTIVE SECToR
Underlying Fundamental Rights
Policy Recommendations
• Relevant fundamental rights to be considered in the field of autonomous driving are: human 
dignity, right to self-determination and liberty, right to life and security, right to protection of 
personal data, right to equality and non-discrimination as well as the right to explanation.
• It must be realized that there will be no technologies or policies that maximize all fundamental 
rights for everybody simultaneously. There will always be trade-offs. Therefore, policymakers and 
legislators should decide which fundamental rights are to be prioritized in particular situations.
• In doing so, policymakers and legislators should cooperate with multiple stakeholders to obtain 
necessary information for executing an evaluation and subsequent agreement on compromises 
and prioritization.
Human Agency and oversight
Industry Recommendations
• There should be a conditional override option allowing the control to be handed back to the 
driver. The admissibility of an override function depends on the level of automation of the AV 
(up to level 3: at any time; level 4: corresponding to safety mechanisms of an AV; level 5: not 
required) as well as on the state and behavior of the driver (e.g., impaired ability).
• AVs should continuously assess and monitor the driver’s attentiveness and ability to intervene. 
Before operation, the AV could pose control questions to the driver (e.g., did you ingest any 
drugs or alcohol?); during operation, the AV could use sensors and biometric technology to do 
so. The upcoming UN Regulation on Automated Lane Keeping Systems can serve as a baseline 
for car manufacturers to develop appropriate driver attentiveness recognition systems.
• Handover should correspond to the driver’s capabilities. Therefore, AVs could learn about drivers’ 
capabilities and response times during operation from aggregated data and adjust the vehicle’s 
parameters accordingly (respecting a safe minimum time response).
• Companies should provide documentation that justifies their particular handover window.
• Training programs should be tailored to different demographic groups and exhibit minimum 
elements that should be regarded in a training curriculum (e.g., limitations and capabilities of 
AVs) based on findings of recent studies.
• AVs should offer a ‘training mode’, for the first kilometers to train drivers on the AV’s functioning.
• External human-machine interfaces should clearly communicate about the vehicle’s motion 
intention and awareness of other traffic participants to humans outside the vehicle.
Policy Recommendations
• Policymakers should finalize what constitutes acceptable and legitimate override functions and 
define applicable situations for activation.
• Policymakers should determine standards for drivers’ monitoring, training requirements, handover 
routines and external human-machine interfaces. These standards should be as global as possible.
• Policymakers in each jurisdiction should consider designating an organization in each jurisdiction 
that is allowed to look at the code and data within the AV in the event of a fatal accident involving 
an AV or a corresponding legal proceeding.
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Technical Robustness and Safety
Industry Recommendations
• The prime requirement of AVs should be safety.
• In addition to threats that relate to conventional vehicles, manufacturers of AVs should particularly 
focus on cybersecurity threats. In doing so, companies need to comply with regulations for 
cybersecurity management systems. SAE J3061 could serve as a guideline to design cybersecurity 
into AVs throughout the entire development life cycle process.
• In terms of general functionality and safety, vehicles need to pass an official test that assures 
the system’s accuracy, reliability and adequacy of its fallback options. The SAE Driving Safety 
Performance Assessment Metrics and the IEEE P7009 standard could serve as a baseline to 
design fail-safe mechanisms of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems.
Policy Recommendations
• Regulations need to be developed that reflect consensus on the method by which to grant approval 
to a vehicle’s cybersecurity management system.
• Policymakers need to work with industry experts to develop a standardized test for the general 
functionality and safety of AVs to assure the system’s accuracy, reliability and adequacy of its 
fallback options. This test could serve as a basis for the approval of AVs for sale to consumers.
• Policymakers need to collaborate with industry experts to determine and harmonize the definition 
of a ‘safe condition’ / ‘minimal risk condition’, the corresponding ‘minimum risk maneuvers’, 
and the circumstances in which such maneuvers should be executed. In doing so, SAE J3016 
could serve as a baseline.
Privacy and data Governance
Industry Recommendations
• Manufacturers should follow a strict privacy and data governance policy that includes transparency 
and communication to users, requesting affirmative consent and allowing limited sharing of data 
with third parties (including governments). In doing so, companies should comply with applicable 
standards and regulations such as the GDPR, the ePrivacy directive or the IEEE P7002.
• Before transmitting personal information from an AV to third parties, steps must be taken to 
ensure that it cannot be traced back to an individual.
• Manufacturers should implement data protocols defining who can have access to data under 
which conditions.
Policy Recommendations
• Before receiving AV data, policymakers need to make clear what types of AV data they are 
seeking and how that data will enable them to improve public safety or some other legitimate 
public purpose (e.g., improve infrastructure, traffic flow and law compliance).
• At the EU level, building on Article 3(c) of Directive 2010/40/EU, consideration should be given 
to expanding the list of events and relevant traffic information that should be communicated 
free of charge.
International Journal of Technoethics
Volume 12 • Issue 1 • January-June 2021
118
diversity, Non-discrimination and Fairness
Industry Recommendations
• Companies should test their vehicle’s AI systems for unfair performance differences across skin 
tone, gender, age and other characteristics. The IEEE P7003 standard can serve as a baseline to 
address and eliminate issues of bias in the creation of algorithms.
• When a technology is launched into the market, companies should localize it using data and train 
the model using multiple diverse data sets that are location specific.
• The AI developing team should be as inclusive as possible to include the broadest group possible 
in terms of demographics such as ethnicity.
• A responsible balancing of risks and estimated harm to reduce the number of personal injuries 
should be permitted for AVs without discriminating against personal characteristics. Instead, 
factors underlying the balancing could include the type or speed of particular traffic participants 
and the impact angle under which a collision would occur.
• The personalization of AVs should be accessible by design and as inclusive as possible (e.g., 
disabilities included). Before an AV is released onto the streets, companies should demonstrate 
their plans and actions that ensure customizing-options to their vehicles (e.g., possibility to take 
away seats or include a ramp for entering the vehicle with a wheelchair).
Policy Recommendations
• Consideration should be given to having ethics standards boards test and assess that the systems 
for AVs are working properly, fairly and in an unbiased manner.
• Consideration should be given to requiring carmakers to explain the procedures they have put 
in place to make their designs accessible and avoid biases before granting them authorization to 
sell their vehicles to the public.
Societal and Environmental wellbeing
Industry Recommendations
• When developing their products, automotive companies should consider integrating and providing 
benefits of increased public health and mobility, better traffic flow and decreased carbon emission.
• Manufacturers should offer by default an eco-driving mode with a speed average that avoids 
unnecessary acceleration or braking and thus reduces carbon emissions.
• When developing AVs, car manufacturers should try to integrate other disruptive technologies 
such as electrification and shared mobility.
Policy Recommendations
• Policymakers should follow a stepwise implementation process and concentrate on mixed traffic 
scenarios. Policymakers should promote the integration of AVs in existing transport systems 
instead of competition between them, for example, by prioritizing research and development of 
AV solutions for public and shared mobility.
• A simultaneous adaption of physical and digital infrastructure is essential (e.g., lanes that separate 
AVs from other traffic).
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• In doing so, collaboration with multiple actors such as private-sector leaders and national agencies 




• Manufacturers should continuously conduct internal audits (e.g., assessing potential risks to the 
safe operation of AVs) and subsequently optimize their systems.
• Manufacturers should be transparent about the scope and process of their internal audits and risk 
assessments (e.g., space of conditions that are checked for).
• The internal audits should be complemented with regular external audits by independent test 
centers.
• Manufacturers should develop specific measures of transparency. This includes storing records and 
data of the underlying system logic (e.g., used training data sets) as well as logging mechanisms 
and black boxes (e.g., an event data recorder and data storage system) that document the actions 
of / in AVs during operation. The upcoming UN Regulation on Automated Lane Keeping Systems 
can serve as a baseline for vehicle manufacturers to develop appropriate data storage systems for 
AVs. SAE J3197 and the IEEE P7001 standard can serve as a baseline to address requirements 
for transparency and accountability of autonomous systems.
• Companies should transparently communicate and report performance and negative impacts of 
AVs (e.g., number of collisions, tradeoffs within algorithms).
Policy Recommendations
• Regulators should adapt laws and regulations concerning AVs and liability as the technology 
continues to develop. Regulators should clarify where responsibility lies in certain situations 
and ensure that privacy and cybersecurity damages are taken into account.
• Policymakers should consider establishing test centers that regularly request that companies 
perform conformity assessments and provide certifications.
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1  All co-authors of this paper constitute the AI4People-Automotive Committee.
2  The levels refer to the taxonomy developed by the SAE International (2018) for six levels of driving 
automation, ranging from no driving automation (level 0) to full driving automation (level 5).
3  The override function does not need to be similar to the way we are driving today such as taking over 
using a steering wheel or a paddle. On the contrary, the control can be a function provided through some 
interfaces that do not take away the original advantages of AVs such as inclusive accessibility.
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